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 chapter 5




The geographical position of the overwhelming majority of coastal States 
means that the maritime zones that they may claim off their coasts (territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (eez) and continental shelf) 
overlap with the maritime zones of one or more neighbouring States. It has 
been estimated that there are about 430 areas worldwide where one or more 
of the maritime zones of neighbouring States overlap.1 Around 250 such areas 
of overlap have already been delimited, totally or partially,2 by a definitive 
boundary, either as a result of a treaty between the States concerned3 or, less 
frequently, by an international court or tribunal.4 That leaves roughly 180 over-
lapping areas where no boundary exists. Such undelimited areas may be char-
acterized as maritime frontier areas in the sense in which the term ‘frontier’ is 
used in this book.
The aim of this chapter is to try to establish what international law obliga-
tions States have in undelimited maritime frontier areas, in particular obliga-
tions designed to avoid the lawlessness and sub- optimal utilization of resources 
often associated with such areas. In the present context such lawlessness may 
result from each of the States whose maritime zones overlap seeking to exer-
cise jurisdiction in the overlapping area not only over ships having its own 
 1 JRV Prescott and CH Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 435.
 2 An example of a partial delimitation would be where the overlapping territorial seas of two 
adjacent States had been delimited, but not their eez s.
 3 For a list of maritime boundary treaties, see British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law (biicl), Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in 
respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas (biicl, 2016) 125– 170 (hereafter biicl Report).
 4 Twenty- four areas had been delimited by judicial decision as at July 2019. Delimitation of 
three further areas was pending before an international court or tribunal. For a slightly dated 
list of cases where a court or tribunal has determined a maritime boundary, see Y Tanaka, The 
International Law of the Sea (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 208.
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nationality but also over foreign ships, including ships having the nationality 
of the other State. Such action is likely to provoke disputes and may even lead 
to the use of force. As regards the sub- optimal utilization of resources, oil com-
panies are usually, although not invariably, reluctant to engage in exploitation 
of hydrocarbon resources without the certainty of knowing which State has 
undisputed sovereign rights to the resources of the continental shelf in the 
area concerned.5 By contrast, fishing in undelimited maritime frontier areas 
may result in over- exploitation of the resource because neighbouring States 
fail to cooperate over its management as they dispute which of them has man-
agement rights, while vessels from third States may be tempted to fish with-
out the permission of the coastal States as they know that those States are in 
dispute as to which has the competence to license and exercise jurisdiction 
over them.
As will become apparent, international law obligations in maritime fron-
tier areas vary, depending on which maritime zone(s) the frontier area com-
prises. This chapter therefore considers the various maritime frontier zones 
separately, beginning with the position where the eez s and the continental 
shelves within 200 nautical miles (M) of the baselines (hereafter inner conti-
nental shelves) of neighbouring States overlap. The chapter then moves on to 
address the situation where continental shelves beyond 200 M overlap, before 
dealing with overlapping territorial seas. It might seem more logical to con-
sider the territorial sea first, as the maritime zone closest to the coast, but the 
international law obligations applying there present an interesting contrast 
with the obligations applying in areas further seawards, and this contrast is 
more readily appreciated if the latter areas are discussed first. There is no sep-
arate discussion of the position where contiguous zones overlap since those 
zones are subsumed within the eez and current international law contains 
no provisions regarding their delimitation. In the sections on the various mar-
itime zones, the discussion will be in terms of the obligations contained in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (losc),6 to which the 
overwhelming majority of the 150 or so coastal States are parties.7 However, 
 5 See NA Ioannides, ‘The Legal Framework governing Hydrocarbon Activities in Undelimited 
Maritime Areas’ (2019) 68 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 345– 368, 359 and 
literature quoted there. He gives the example of an announcement by the French oil com-
pany, Total, in 2018 that it would not operate within the area where the maritime boundary 
between Israel and Lebanon is disputed.
 6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (losc), adopted 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994, 1833 unts 3.
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there are 14 coastal States that are not parties to the Convention and to which 
its obligations therefore do not apply.8 The penultimate section of the chapter 
therefore considers what obligations (if any) apply to such States. The chapter 
ends with some brief conclusions.
2 Obligations in Areas of Overlapping eez s and Inner Continental 
Shelves9
The position regarding overlapping eez s and inner continental shelves will 
be considered together, both because the losc contains identical obliga-
tions in each case (in Articles 74 and 83) and because for States that claim an 
eez (which is most States10) the continental shelf coincides with the seabed 
of the eez. In practice, the majority of States seek to delimit a single mari-
time boundary rather than separate and different boundaries for overlapping 
eez s and inner continental shelves in order to avoid the complications that 
may arise where one State has sovereign rights to exploit the resources of the 
superjacent water column, while another State has sovereign rights over the 
resources of the seabed. Conflicts may occur, for example, if the second State 
wishes to engage in exploitation of oil and gas in an area that is an important 
fishing ground for nationals of the first State. International courts and tribu-
nals have held that Articles 74 and 83 apply equally to the delimitation of single 
maritime boundaries as to the delimitation of separate boundaries for each of 
the eez and continental shelf.11
 8 Ibid.
 9 This section draws to a considerable extent on the biicl Report, above (n 3). The author 
of this chapter was a member of the research team that produced the report and was 
responsible for the first draft of that part of the Report on which this section draws.
 10 Nearly 130 out of a total of some 150 coastal States claim an eez (the author’s calcu-
lation, based, with some updating, on the undoalos Table of Claim to Maritime 
Jurisdiction, showing the position as at 2011, http:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ 
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ PDFFILES/ table_ summary_ of_ claims.pdf; accessed 6 
August 2019.
 11 See, for example, Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, (2002) icj 
Reports, p 303, paras 285– 286; Arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, 
Award, (2006) xxvii riaa 147, paras 234– 235; Case concerning Maritime Delimitation 
in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine), Judgment, (2009) icj Reports, p 61, paras 17, 31; 
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/ Myanmar), 
Judgment, 14 March 2012, itlos Reports 2012, p 4, paras 182– 184; Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, (2012) icj Reports, p 624, para 139; Maritime 
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Articles 74 and 83 are identical apart from the fact that in Article 83 the 
words ‘exclusive economic zone’ that are used in Article 74 are replaced by 
‘continental shelf ’. The articles read as follows:
 1.  The delimitation of the [eez/ continental shelf] between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis 
of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
 2.  If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the 
States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part xv.
 3.  Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, 
in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this 
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final 
agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation.
 4.  Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, 
questions relating to the delimitation of the [eez/ continental shelf] 
shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
These provisions thus set out four obligations on States where their eez s and 
continental shelves overlap, namely:
 1.  To effect a delimitation of their overlapping zones by agreement (Articles 
74(1) and 83(1)).
 2.  To resort to the dispute settlement procedures of Part xv of the losc 
where no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time 
(Articles 74(2) and 83(2)).
 3.  Pending an agreement, to make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature (Articles 74(3) and 83(3)).
 4.  Not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a boundary agreement 
(Articles 74(3) and 83(3)).
The content and scope of each of these obligations will be examined in turn.
2.1 The Obligation to Effect a Delimitation of Overlapping Zones by 
Agreement
This obligation requires the States concerned to enter into negotiations to 
establish a maritime boundary.12 The scope of an obligation to negotiate was 
Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v India), Award, 7 July 2014, pca Case No 2010- 16, 
para 312.
 12 Cameroon/ Nigeria case, above (n 11), para 244; Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean 




Robin Churchill - 9789004372887
Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:01:47PM
via free access
International Law Obligations of States 145
spelt out in general terms by the International Court of Justice (icj) in the 
North Sea cases. According to the Court:
[T] he parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a 
view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a forma1 
process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic appli-
cation of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; 
they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negoti-
ations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them 
insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification 
of it … [I]n its Advisory Opinion in the case of Railway Traffic between 
Lithuania and Poland, [the Permanent Court of International Justice] 
said that the obligation was “not only to enter into negotiations but also 
to pursue them as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements”, 
even if an obligation to negotiate did not imply an obligation to reach 
agreement.13
In the Cameroon/ Nigeria case, the icj, referring explicitly to Articles 74 and 83, 
emphasized that while negotiations must be conducted in good faith, it was 
not a requirement that they be successful.14
Thus, negotiations under Articles 74 and 83 must be conducted in good faith 
and be meaningful in the sense described in the North Sea cases. The aim of the 
negotiations, according to the articles, is to ‘achieve an equitable solution’ ‘on 
the basis of international law’. Logic suggests that any maritime boundary on 
which the parties are genuinely agreed, without one party having been coerced 
Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment, 23 September 2017, itlos 
Reports 2017, p 4, para 604.
 13 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v The Netherlands), Judgment, (1969) icj Reports, p 3, paras 85, 87 
(omitting footnotes in the original). See also Application of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, (2011) icj Reports, p 70, paras 157– 161, which contains 
a similar but slightly more detailed explanation of what is involved in the obligation to 
negotiate. In particular, the obligation to negotiate in good faith is emphasized.
 14 Cameroon/ Nigeria case, above (n 11), para 244. So, too, Somalia v Kenya, above (n 12), para 
90. In the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case the Special Chamber of the itlos noted that the obli-
gation to negotiate was an obligation of conduct, not of result: see Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire 
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by the other in some way,15 must be considered to be an ‘equitable solution’. 
If the parties are happy with the boundary, it is not open to a third party to 
argue that the boundary is inequitable. As regards the phrase, ‘on the basis of 
international law’, discussion here will be confined to seeking to identify the 
meaning of ‘on the basis of ’. To consider what is meant by ‘international law’ 
in this context would take us into the substantive law of maritime boundary 
delimitation, which lies beyond the scope of this chapter.16 The phrase ‘on the 
basis of ’ does not appear to have been the object of judicial comment, but 
its ordinary meaning would suggest that States need not strictly adhere to 
international law when negotiating a maritime boundary. In any case, there 
is so much flexibility in the relevant international law that the requirement 
of Articles 74 and 83 that an agreement must be ‘effected … on the basis of 
international law’ is in practice unlikely to be a constraining factor on States in 
negotiating a boundary.
A further element of the obligation to negotiate concerns paragraph 4 of 
Articles 74 and 83. This provides that ‘[w] here there is an agreement in force 
between the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the 
[eez/ continental shelf] shall be determined in accordance with the provi-
sions of that agreement’. At first sight this provision might appear redundant. 
If there is an agreement in force, why would States still be negotiating a mari-
time boundary agreement? However, the provision does have some potential 
purpose or application. For example, there may already be an agreement in 
force between the States concerned setting out principles to be applied in 
a future maritime delimitation. That was the position in the Black Sea case, 
for example.17 Or there may be an agreement that has already delimited part 
of the boundary.18 Conceivably, there could be a tacit agreement establish-
ing part of the boundary, as the icj found to be the situation in the Peru/ 
Chile case.19 A further possibility might be where the States concerned were 
successors to a prior agreement between States to whose treaties they had 
succeeded.
 15 Coercion would invalidate a boundary agreement:  see Arts 51 and 52 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 
unts 331. Any fraud or corruption would also invalidate an agreement: see Arts 49 and 50.
 16 For discussion of what it embraces, see the biicl Report, above (n 3), 10– 11.
 17 Black Sea case, above (n 11), paras 27, 33, 41.
 18 Cf. ibid para 69.
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2.2 The Obligation to Resort to the Dispute Settlement Procedures of 
Part xv of the losc Where No Agreement Can Be Reached within a 
Reasonable Period of Time
Articles 74(2) and 83(2) oblige States to resort to the dispute settlement proce-
dures of Part xv ‘[i] f no agreement [on a maritime boundary] can be reached 
within a reasonable period of time’. That raises the question of whether the 
States concerned are obliged to wait until ‘a reasonable period of time’ has 
elapsed before referring an unresolved maritime boundary to the dispute set-
tlement procedures of Part xv or whether one of them may refer a dispute uni-
laterally to such procedures before the elapse of ‘a reasonable period of time’. 
In the Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago case, in which Barbados had unilaterally 
instituted arbitration proceedings against Trinidad and Tobago, the arbitral 
tribunal implied that the former was the case since it discussed whether ‘a rea-
sonable period time of time’ had actually elapsed. As regards that question, the 
tribunal found that as the parties had held nine rounds of negotiations over a 
period of nearly three and a half years without approaching agreement, ‘a rea-
sonable period of time’ had elapsed.20 The Timor- Leste/ Australia Conciliation 
Commission took a rather different approach. The Commission was faced with 
applying, not Articles 74(2) and 83(2) of the losc, but a very similar provision 
in Article 298(1)(a)(i), which stipulates that a State may unilaterally initiate 
conciliation proceedings relating to a maritime boundary dispute only where 
‘no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations 
between the parties’. The Commission observed that this provision ‘does not 
expressly require that prior negotiations between the parties to the dispute 
actually take place. Such a requirement would effectively grant a party the 
right to veto any recourse to compulsory conciliation by refusing to negotiate, 
contrary to the intentions of Article 298’.21 The Commission found that negoti-
ations had in fact taken place. Thus, it did not have to consider whether Article 
298 might at least require a party initiating conciliation proceedings to have 
called on the other party beforehand to engage in negotiations.
Although the obligation to resort to the dispute settlement procedures of 
the losc is couched in mandatory terms in Articles 74(2) and 83(2), it is obvi-
ous that if neither of the parties wishes to refer the matter to a court or tribunal 
after what might be considered a ‘reasonable period of time’ for negotiations, 
they cannot in practice be compelled to do so, but may continue to negotiate 
 20 Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago case, above (n 11), paras 194– 200.
 21 Conciliation between the Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste and the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Decision on Australia’s Objection to Competence, 19 September 2016, pca Case 
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in the hope that they will eventually reach agreement on a boundary. It would 
also seem to be the case that the parties may, by agreement, refer a maritime 
boundary dispute to the dispute settlement procedures of Part xv, regardless 
of how much time had elapsed since the dispute arose.
As regards ‘the procedures provided for in Part xv’ to which Articles 74(2) 
and 83(2) refer, they include both diplomatic and judicial means of dispute 
settlement. In the case of diplomatic means, the reference in Articles 74(2) and 
83(2) must be to third party means since by definition at least one of the States 
concerned considers that the possibility of reaching agreement by negotiation 
has been exhausted. Under section 1 of Part xv the referral of a dispute to set-
tlement by such means, i.e. mediation, conciliation or enquiry, has to be with 
the agreement of both the States concerned. By contrast, one party may refer a 
delimitation dispute unilaterally for settlement by judicial means (the icj, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) or arbitration) unless the 
other party has made a declaration under Article 298 of the losc excluding 
the delimitation of maritime boundaries from the compulsory judicial settle-
ment procedures of Part xv. At the present time only around one- quarter of 
States parties to the losc have made such a declaration.22 Where one party 
has made such a declaration, the other party may, provided certain conditions 
are fulfilled, unilaterally initiate conciliation proceedings.23 A further excep-
tion to the use of judicial means under Part xv of the losc is if there is an 
agreement between the States concerned to refer disputes relating to the losc 
to some other judicial means, for example if both States have made declara-
tions under Article 36(2) of the icj’s Statute (the optional clause).24
2.3 The Obligation to Make Every Effort to Enter into Provisional 
Arrangements of a Practical Nature Pending an Agreement25
According to the arbitral tribunal in the Guyana/ Suriname case, the obligation 
to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature
 22 For a list of States that have made declarations, see http:// www.un.org/ depts/ los/ settle-
ment_ of_ disputes/ choice_ procedure.htm; accessed 26 June 2019.
 23 losc, above (n 6), Art 298(1)(a). The first, and so far only, instance of such conciliation 
was when Timor- Leste initiated conciliation proceedings against Australia in 2016. See 
Conciliation Proceedings between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste 
and the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report and Recommendations, 9 
May 2018, pca Case No 2016- 10.
 24 losc, above (n 6), Art 282. On the relationship between such other agreements and Part 
xv of the losc, see Somalia v Kenya case, above (n 12), paras 107– 133.
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is designed to promote interim regimes and practical measures that 
could pave the way for provisional utilization of disputed areas pending 
delimitation. In the view of the Tribunal, this obligation constitutes an 
implicit acknowledgment of the importance of avoiding the suspension 
of economic development in a disputed maritime area, as long as such 
activities do not affect the reaching of a final agreement.26
The obligation in Articles 74(3) and 83(3) is ‘to make every effort’ to enter into 
provisional arrangements. According to the Special Chamber of the itlos in 
the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, this is an obligation of conduct, not of result. 
Thus, it does not amount to an obligation to reach an agreement on a provi-
sional arrangement, although there is a duty to act in good faith.27 The tribu-
nal in the Guyana/ Suriname case amplified this latter point by observing that 
‘[t] he language in which the obligation is framed imposes on the Parties a duty 
to negotiate [a provisional arrangement] in good faith’ and requires them to 
take ‘a conciliatory approach to negotiations, pursuant to which they would be 
prepared to make concessions in the pursuit of a provisional arrangement’.28 
The Special Chamber in the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case held that a party to an 
undelimited maritime boundary dispute does not breach the obligation to 
make every effort to enter into a provisional arrangement unless it has been 
asked by the other party to negotiate such an arrangement and it has declined 
to do so.29 It would thus appear to follow that in practice the obligation does 
not arise for either party until such a request has been made.
The losc does not prescribe or indicate what form a provisional arrange-
ment should take or what its content should be. The term ‘arrangement’ would 
suggest that a provisional arrangement may take various forms, ranging from a 
treaty to more informal and even non- legally binding agreed measures.30 The 
requirement in Article 74(3) and 83(3) that a provisional arrangement be of 
a ‘practical nature’ indicates that the arrangement should address the practi-
cal issues to which overlapping claims give rise, in particular the exploitation 
of resources (as suggested by the Guyana/ Suriname case31) and the exercise 
 26 Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, Award, (2007) xxx riaa 1, para 460 (footnotes 
omitted).
 27 Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, above (n 12), para 627.
 28 Guyana/ Suriname case, above (n 26), para 461.
 29 Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, above (n 12), para 628.
 30 On the question of when less formal instruments may be legally binding, see the South 
China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China), Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 29 October 2015, pca Case No 2013- 19, paras 213– 218.
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of jurisdiction. Anderson and van Logchem suggest that the content of an 
arrangement can range widely, including a co- operative arrangement or joint 
regime that permits the exploration and exploitation in an undelimited area to 
proceed, a partial or total moratorium on certain types of activity such as drill-
ing, or simply an arrangement of prior notification of a proposed activity in the 
undelimited area followed by consultations.32 According to the Timor- Leste/ 
Australia Conciliation Commission, a conciliation commission acting under 
Article 298(1)(a) of the losc is competent to propose provisional arrange-
ments as part of its functions.33
In practice provisional arrangements, at least those that are publicized,34 
usually take one of two main forms – a provisional boundary line or an area 
of joint management. A good example of a provisional boundary is an agree-
ment between Algeria and Tunisia concluded in 2002 that established a pro-
visional single maritime boundary between the two States.35 The preamble to 
the agreement refers to Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the losc, while Article 4 
states that the agreement is without prejudice to the final delimitation of the 
maritime boundary.36
Provisional arrangements in the form of a joint management or exploita-
tion zone take various forms and may relate to a particular activity or a num-
ber of activities. Some arrangements are concerned only with the exploitation 
of seabed resources. A  good example is an agreement between Nigeria and 
São Tomé e Príncipe of 2001 which establishes a joint development zone, in 
an area where their eez s overlap, for the orderly exploration and exploitation 
of petroleum and other resources.37 The agreement deals, inter alia, with the 
 32 D Anderson and Y van Logchem, ‘Rights and Obligations in Areas of Overlapping Maritime 
Claims’ in S Jayakumar, T Koh and R Beckman (eds), The South China Sea Disputes and the 
Law of the Sea (Edward Elgar, 2014) 192– 228, 206.
 33 Timor- Lest/ Australia Conciliation Commission, Decision on Competence, above (n 21), 
para 97.
 34 It is possible that there are informal arrangements whose existence is not generally pub-
licized outside of the States concerned.
 35 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries 
between the Republic of Tunisia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 
adopted 11 February 2002, in force 23 November 2003, 2238 unts 197. For further exam-
ples of provisional boundary agreements, see biicl Report, above (n 3), 40– 116 passim.
 36 It has been reported that a definitive boundary agreement was signed in 2011:  see 
WikiLeaks, ‘The Global Intelligence Files: Algeria/ Tunisia’ (released 15 November 2013), 
https:// wikileaks.org/ gifiles/ docs/ 20/ 2053850_ - os- algeria- tunisia- algeria- tunisia- ink- 
agreement- on.html; accessed 26 June 2019.
 37 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of São 
Tomé e Príncipe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and Other Resources, in respect 
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establishment of joint bodies to manage the development of the zone, the 
sharing of revenue between the parties, the laws and regulations to be applied 
in the zone, and environmental protection. The preamble to the agreement 
refers to Article 74(3) of losc and states that the agreement is ‘without preju-
dice to the eventual delimitation of their respective maritime zones by agree-
ment in accordance with international law’. The agreement is to remain in 
force for 45 years, with a review after 30 years.38 That might be thought to be 
a very long time for a ‘provisional’ arrangement, but a lengthy period is nec-
essary if oil companies are to have the desired security for their investments.
An example of a provisional arrangement establishing a joint management 
or exploitation zone for fisheries, albeit concluded before the adoption of 
the losc, is an agreement between Norway and the then ussr, concluded in 
1978.39 The agreement applied to an area in the southern part of the Barents 
Sea where the eez s of Norway and the ussr overlapped. Within that area total 
allowable catches, quotas and other regulatory measures were adopted by a 
bilateral Norwegian/ Soviet (later Russian) Fishery Commission. Each party 
had jurisdiction in the area only in respect of its own fishing vessels and such 
third State vessels as it had licensed to fish against its quota. The agreement 
was originally concluded for one year only, but contained an option for annual 
renewals thereafter. That option was exercised continuously until the entry 
into force in 2011 of a 2010 treaty establishing a definitive maritime boundary 
between Norway and Russia, when the agreement lapsed.40
In some cases joint management or exploitation zones as a form of pro-
visional arrangement have been established to deal with a number of differ-
ent matters. A good example is an agreement between Barbados and Guyana, 
concluded in 2003, that establishes a ‘co- operation zone for the exercise of 
joint jurisdiction, control, management, development, and exploration and 
exploitation of living and non- living natural resources, as well as all other 
rights and duties established in’ the losc, in a small area where their eez s 
in force 16 January 2003, http:// www.un.org/ Depts/ los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/ TREATIES/ STP- NGA2001.PDF; accessed 26 June 2019.
 38 Ibid Art 51.
 39 Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union on a Temporary Practical Arrangement 
for Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents Sea, 11 January 1978, in force 27 April 1978, 
[1978] Overenskomster med fremmede Stater [Norwegian Treaty Series] 436. English trans-
lation in Case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen (Denmark v Norway), Counter- Memorial of Norway, Vol ii, p 230.
 40 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, adopted 15 
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overlap and which is beyond the eez of any third State.41 The preamble to the 
agreement recognizes ‘the relevance and applicability’ of Article 74(3) of losc. 
Article 2(1) of the agreement states that ‘the parties contemplate that they 
may, by agreement at a later date, delimit an international maritime boundary 
between them’, and Article 1(2) provides that the agreement is without preju-
dice ‘to the eventual delimitation of the Parties’ respective maritime zones’.42
As noted above, in the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case the Special Chamber held 
that one party cannot claim that the other party is in breach of the obliga-
tion to ‘make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature’ unless it has requested the other party to enter into negotiations. That 
raises the question of at what point in time it may make such a request. In 
theory, it would seem to be possible to do so as soon as it becomes evident that 
the States concerned have maritime zones that overlap and therefore require 
delimitation. In practice, a State might not want to make a request unless and 
until it had become evident that it and the other State were unlikely to reach 
agreement on a maritime boundary easily and quickly. If they were likely to 
reach agreement easily, it would be pointless to hold up negotiations by dis-
cussing possible provisional arrangements. Furthermore, if in practice no mar-
itime activities were taking place in the undelimited area, there would be no 
purpose in seeking an agreement on provisional arrangements.
It would seem from the opening words of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) (‘pend-
ing agreement’) that a provisional arrangement will continue until a definitive 
maritime boundary is established, either by agreement between the parties 
or by a court, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the arrangement. 
Examples of the latter are the Algeria/ Tunisia arrangement, discussed above, 
which provided that it was to remain in force for six years, after which the 
parties undertook to agree on a definitive maritime boundary or to extend or 
revise the agreement;43 and the Nigeria/ São Tomé e Príncipe arrangement, 
which is to remain in force for 45 years, with a review after 30 years.44
 41 Treaty between the Republic of Guyana and the State of Barbados concerning the Exercise 
of Jurisdiction in their Exclusive Economic Zones in the Area of Bilateral Overlap within 
each of their Outer Limits and beyond the Outer Limits of the Exclusive Economic Zones 
of Other States, adopted 2 December 2003, in force 5 May 2004, 2277 unts 201. It should 
be noted that the co- operation zone is not necessarily beyond the continental shelf of any 
third State.
 42 For further examples of provisional arrangements in the form of a joint management or 
exploitation zone, see biicl Report, above (n 3), pp 40– 116 passim.
 43 Agreement, above (n 35), Arts 9, 10.
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Because a provisional arrangement is, according to Articles 74(3) and 83(3), 
‘without prejudice to the final delimitation’, the arrangement, and activities 
undertaken thereunder, cannot, unless the States concerned expressly agree 
otherwise, create acquired rights to the undelimited area or its resources, 
require the States concerned to take the arrangement into account in their 
negotiations on a maritime boundary, or prevent them from taking a position 
in those negotiations that is inconsistent with the provisional arrangement.45
2.4 The Obligation Not to Jeopardize or Hamper the Reaching of a 
Boundary Agreement46
In the Guyana/ Suriname case the tribunal observed that the obligation, set out 
in Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the losc, ‘not to jeopardize or hamper the reach-
ing of the final [maritime boundary] agreement’ is ‘an important aspect of the 
[Law of the Sea] Convention’s objective of strengthening peace and friendly 
relations between nations and of settling disputes peacefully. However, it is 
important to note that this obligation was not intended to preclude all activ-
ities in a disputed maritime area’.47 The obligation raises three main ques-
tions: (1) what is its substantive scope? (2) what is its geographic scope? and 
(3) what is its temporal scope?
2.4.1 The Substantive Scope of the Obligation Not to Jeopardize 
or Hamper
As regards the substantive scope of the obligation, the losc does not define 
the terms ‘jeopardize’ and ‘hamper’, nor does it suggest what types of con-
duct are covered by those terms. The matter has to date been considered by 
two judicial bodies, the arbitral tribunal in the Guyana/ Suriname case and 
the Special Chamber of the itlos in the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case. Both cases 
were concerned with hydrocarbon activity in an undelimited area pending its 
delimitation. However, the two bodies took markedly different approaches to 
the substantive scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.
In the Guyana/ Suriname case, the tribunal held that drilling for hydro-
carbons in an area claimed by both parties was a breach of the obligation. 
However, the language in which it explained why that was so is not consistent. 
 45 See R Lagoni, ‘Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements’ (1984) 78 
American Journal of International Law 345– 368, 359.
 46 For more detailed treatment of this issue, see biicl Report, above (n 3), 21– 35 and litera-
ture cited there. However, that part of the Report now needs to be read in the light of the 
Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, discussed below.
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The tribunal began by stating that ‘unilateral acts which do not cause a physi-
cal change to the marine environment’ would ‘generally’ not breach the obliga-
tion, whereas ‘acts that do cause physical change … may hamper or prejudice 
the reaching of a final agreement on delimitation’.48 However, the tribunal 
gives four further definitions of actions that (are likely to) breach the obliga-
tion not to jeopardize or hamper. They are: ‘activities of the kind that lead to 
a permanent physical change’;49 ‘unilateral activity that might affect the other 
party’s rights in a permanent manner’;50 ‘activities having a permanent physi-
cal impact on the marine environment’;51 and activities that ‘cause permanent 
damage to the marine environment’.52 This list of activities falls into two broad 
categories: activities that cause (permanent) physical change or damage to, or 
have a (permanent) physical impact on, the marine environment; and activi-
ties that might affect the other party’s rights in a permanent manner. While the 
activities in the first category are broadly similar, although they differ as to the 
permanency or otherwise of their adverse effects, the latter category is concep-
tually quite different and alludes to one of the requirements for the prescrip-
tion of provisional measures.53 It is debatable whether such a test is appropri-
ate to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in Articles 74(3) and 83(3),54 
and in any case the test is probably too strict, as it is possible to envisage con-
duct that does not affect the other party’s rights in a permanent way, yet that 
would clearly seem to be jeopardizing or hampering. The tribunal suggested 
that seismic exploration in an undelimited area would not fall into either of 
its two broad categories and therefore ‘should be permissible’.55 However, as 
van Logchem points out, there could be situations where even seismic test-
ing by one party could affect the other party’s rights or would be regarded by 
it as jeopardizing the prospects of a maritime boundary agreement because 
the information gained by the State carrying out the testing would give it an 
 48 Ibid para 467. The Tribunal found support for its view in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
(Greece v Turkey), Interim Measures of Protection, Order, icj Reports 1976, p 3, para 30. 
Van Logchem criticizes the tribunal for its reliance on this case: see Y van Logchem, ‘The 
Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas’ in C Schofield, S Lee and M- S Kwon 
(eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff, 2014) 175– 197, 186– 191.
 49 Guyana/ Suriname case, above (n 26), para 467.
 50 Ibid para 470.
 51 Ibid.
 52 Ibid para 481.
 53 See further van Logchem, above (n 48), 184– 185.
 54 Ibid 191.
 55 Guyana/ Suriname case, above (n 26), para 481. Cf. also para 467, where there is a less 
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advantage over the State with whom the boundary was disputed.56 In a simi-
lar vein, Ioannides argues that recent scientific research suggests that seismic 
testing may have a serious impact on the marine environment that is irrevers-
ible and could be further jeopardizing because data obtained from the testing 
might be made available to a third State.57
In the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, Côte d’Ivoire argued that Ghana breached 
the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper by engaging in the exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons in the disputed area before the Special Chamber 
delimited the boundary. In response, the Special Chamber began by noting that 
the phrase ‘shall make every effort’ in Article 83(3) applied to both provisional 
arrangements and the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, thereby qualify-
ing the latter as an obligation of conduct. The Special Chamber disagreed with 
Côte d’Ivoire that Ghana’s activities in the disputed area during the period after 
it realized that that area was also claimed by Côte d’Ivoire, which appears to 
have been in 2009, had jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final agree-
ment. That was so for two reasons. First, Ghana had suspended drilling opera-
tions in the disputed area following an order of provisional measures made by 
the Special Chamber in 2015. However, the Chamber added that it would ‘have 
been preferable if Ghana had adhered to the request of Côte d’Ivoire earlier to 
suspend its hydrocarbon activities in [the undelimited] area’.58 This reasoning 
is unconvincing. The period to which the obligation applies (discussed in sec-
tion 2.4.3 below) clearly began well before the order of provisional measures. 
To say that it ‘would have been preferable’ if Ghana had ceased its activities 
before the provisional measures order is to confuse a legal obligation with an 
apparently moral one. It is also difficult to reconcile the Special Chamber’s 
decision with the tribunal’s findings in the Guyana/ Suriname case. The second 
reason given by the Special Chamber as to why Ghana had not breached the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper was because Ghana had only under-
taken activities in the area attributed to it by the Special Chamber’s line of 
delimitation, whereas Côte d’Ivoire had claimed a breach of Article 83(3) by 
Ghana in respect of its activities in the ‘Ivoirian maritime area’.59 Again, this 
is not convincing as it gives Ghana the benefit of what is arguably simply a 
drafting technicality.
 56 Van Logchem, above (n 48), 184– 185.
 57 Ioannides, above (n 5), 363, 368.
 58 Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, above (n 12), para 632. The discussion of the case in this section 
draws heavily on R Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2017’ 
(2018) 33(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 653– 682, 656– 667.
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Had Côte d’Ivoire been claiming compensation in respect of Ghana’s 
alleged breach of Article 83(3), the Special Chamber’s approach might perhaps 
have been perhaps more understandable, but in fact Côte d’Ivoire was seek-
ing no more than a declaration of Ghana’s breach. Unfortunately, the Special 
Chamber’s approach to the obligation in this case may send the wrong signal 
to other States with unresolved maritime boundaries.60
In a separate opinion, Judge Paik expressed considerable disagreement with 
this approach. Although he voted for the operative part of the judgment, that 
was only because Côte d’Ivoire had limited its claim to the ‘Ivorian maritime 
area’. ‘Leaving that formalistic reason aside’, he had ‘serious reservations about 
the correctness of Ghana’s activities in the disputed area in terms’ of Article 
83(3).61 The reasons set out in the judgment in support of its conclusion were 
‘insufficient and unconvincing’.62 As to what actions would jeopardize or ham-
per the reaching of a final boundary agreement, Judge Paik considered that 
there was no purpose in attempting to identify in general and in the abstract 
what actions were permissible and what were not. However, ‘a key criterion 
is whether the actions in question would have the effect of endangering the 
process of reaching a final agreement or impeding the progress of negotiations 
to that end’.63 For Judge Paik, the answer to that question would very much 
depend on the individual circumstances in each case, such as the type, nature, 
location and time of the actions in question, as well as the manner in which 
they were carried out.64 In the present case Ghana had carried out exten-
sive drilling activities in the disputed area in spite of Côte d’Ivoire’s repeated 
requests that it should abstain from unilateral action. That was clearly a breach 
of Article 83(3) and it was irrelevant that the disputed area was eventually allo-
cated to Ghana by the Special Chamber’s delimitation. Judge Paik’s approach 
 60 For similar criticisms of the Special Chamber’s approach, see N Bankes, ‘itlos Judgment 
in the Maritime Boundary Dispute between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire’, Jebsen Centre for 
the Law of the Sea, Tromsø (jclos) Blog, posted 27 October 2017, http:// site.uit.no/ nclos/ 
2017/ 10/ 27/ itlos- judgment- in- the- maritime- boundary- dispute- between- ghana- and- 
cote- divoire/ ; accessed 26 June 2019; N Ermolina and C Yiallorides, ‘State Responsibility 
for Unilateral Hydrocarbon Activities in Disputed Maritime Areas:  The Case of Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire and its Implications’, jclos Blog, posted 23 November 2017, http:// 
site.uit.no/ nclos/ 2017/ 11/ 23/ state- responsibility- for- unilateral- hydrocarbon- activities- 
in- disputed- maritime- areas- the- case- of- ghana- and- cote- divoire- and- its- implications/ ; 
accessed 26 June 2019; Ioannides, above (n 5), 364– 365.
 61 Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, above (n 12), Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, para 1.
 62 Ibid.
 63 Ibid para 6. Anderson and van Logchem had earlier expressed similar views: see Anderson 
and van Logchem, above (n 32), 206; Van Logchem, above (n 48), 186.
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to Article 83(3) is far more convincing and satisfactory that than of the judg-
ment, and it is to be regretted that the other judges did not apparently share 
his views.
Both the Guyana/ Suriname and Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire cases were concerned 
with the meaning and scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in 
relation to hydrocarbon resources of the seabed. The position in relation to 
the living resources of the superjacent water column may well be rather differ-
ent.65 In seeking to establish what the position is, one should take into account 
the tribunal’s dictum in the Guyana/ Suriname case (quoted earlier66) that the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is not intended to preclude all activi-
ties in a disputed maritime area; the provisions of Articles 61– 63 of the losc 
(which require coastal States both to promote the optimum utilization of the 
living resources of their eez s and to ensure that they are not endangered by 
over- exploitation, as well as to co- operate over the management of shared 
stocks); and the renewable nature of fish stocks. The mutual ‘due regard’ obli-
gation of the coastal and other States found in Article 56(2) and 58(3), respec-
tively, might also be relevant. Those considerations would suggest that in gen-
eral the States concerned could permit their vessels to fish in an undelimited 
area, without the likelihood of jeopardizing or hampering negotiations on a 
boundary, provided that they did so at a level that their combined activities did 
not lead to the over- exploitation of resources. That would require those States 
to exchange information about the level of their fishing activities and to ter-
minate fishing once a sustainable level of fishing was about to be exceeded.67 
However, any attempt by one State to arrest vessels of the other State that were 
fishing, whether before or after the fishery had been closed, would be likely 
to be regarded as provocative and as jeopardizing the prospects of reaching 
agreement on a boundary, and therefore should be regarded as conduct that 
would breach the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.68
 65 Reasons of space preclude discussion of the position concerning a coastal State’s other 
rights in the water column of the eez. For such a discussion, see biicl Report, above (n 
3), 28– 29; Ioannides, above (n 5), 367.
 66 See the text above at n 47; see also Guyana/ Suriname case, above (n 26) para 470.
 67 A similar approach was taken by the ila’s Committee on the Exclusive Economic Zone in 
its 1992 report: see ila, Report of the Seventy- Sixth Conference (1992) 254, 275– 276.
 68 So, too, Anderson and van Logchem, above (n 32), 219; van Logchem, above (n 48), 193. 
In the Guyana/ Suriname case, above (n 26), the tribunal regarded the threat of force by 
Suriname against a drilling rig licensed by Guyana as a breach of the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper (see para 484). The arrest of fishing vessels will often involve some 









Robin Churchill - 9789004372887
Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:01:47PM
via free access
158 Churchill
Fishing by vessels from third States in an undelimited area raises particular 
difficulties. Any attempt by one of the States concerned unilaterally to license 
third State vessels to fish in the area or to arrest third State vessels that were 
either unlicensed or breaching the conditions of their licence might well be 
regarded by the other State concerned as breaching the obligation not to jeop-
ardize or hamper. On the other hand, if no action is taken against third State 
vessels, it is likely that such vessels will fish in the undelimited area and that 
they will do so at a level that leads to the over- exploitation of stocks, as has 
happened in some parts of the world. If the two coastal States wish to pre-
vent that happening, they may have little option but to enter into some form 
of provisional arrangement to address the issue of third State fishing in the 
undelimited area, as Norway and the then Soviet Union did in the agreement 
referred to above.69
The biicl report, while not comprehensive in its geographical coverage, 
records a considerable amount of State practice relating to the obligation not 
to jeopardize or hamper, both as regards seabed and water column rights.70 The 
question arises as to whether that practice is such that it may be used to pro-
vide further interpretation of the losc’s obligation not to jeopardize or ham-
per, beyond the interpretation offered by the two judicial decisions discussed 
above, in accordance with Articles 31(3)(b) and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. Article 31(3)(b) provides that in interpreting a treaty, 
account shall be taken of ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpre-
tation’. Article 32 is concerned with supplementary means of interpretation. 
According to the International Law Commission (ilc), those means include 
subsequent practice other than that referred to in Article 31(3)(b).71 The ilc 
defines such other practice as ‘conduct by one or more parties in the applica-
tion of the treaty, after its conclusion’.72
As far as Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention is concerned, prac-
tice that predates the ‘conclusion’ of the losc is clearly not relevant. Post- 
conclusion practice is between pairs of States. It is doubtful whether prac-
tice of this nature, even if considerable in extent, can be said to ‘establish the 
agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of ’ the losc. According 
 69 See (n 39).
 70 See biicl Report, above (n 3), 40– 116 passim.
 71 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on subsequent agreements and subse-
quent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, adopted by the Commission at its 
70th Session, 2018, UN Doc A/ cn.4/ L.907 (2018) 120, Draft Conclusion 2(4).
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to the ilc, the identification of subsequent practice requires ‘a determina-
tion whether the parties, by … a practice, have taken a position regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty’.73 However, practice evidencing recognition of an 
obligation of restraint hardly ever makes explicit reference to the obligation 
in Articles 74(3) and 83(3). It seems unlikely, therefore, that such practice can 
be taken as showing that the parties concerned ‘have taken a position regard-
ing the interpretation’ of Articles 74(3) and 83(3). Furthermore, Article 31(3)
(b) and the ilc draft conclusions also appear to suggest that practice must evi-
dence a collective view of the parties as to the meaning of a provision.74 That 
is also the view of Aust, who argues that for practice to fall within Article 31(3)
(b) it must be ‘consistent and … common to, or accepted, expressly or tacitly, 
by both or all parties’ to a treaty.75 It must be doubted whether existing State 
practice meets that test.
As regards subsequent practice under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, 
the ilc states that ‘[t] he identification of subsequent practice under Article 32 
requires, in particular, a determination of whether conduct by one or more par-
ties is in application of the treaty’.76 As already mentioned, such examples of 
State practice as do indicate an acknowledgment of an obligation of restraint 
rarely refer to Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the losc. It is unlikely, therefore, that 
there is sufficient practice ‘in application’ of those Articles to constitute an 
accepted interpretation of them.
2.4.2 The Geographic Scope of the Obligation Not to Jeopardize 
or Hamper
Having examined the substantive scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper, the next question is its geographic scope.77 In an undelimited area 
where the maritime zones of two States overlap, there are likely to be areas 
that each State accepts belong incontestably to only one or other of them and 
therefore are not in dispute. Often a State will make it clear at an early stage 
where it considers that the boundary should lie and will stick to that position 
until a compromise emerges in the negotiations or a court or tribunal deter-
mines the boundary. For example, Norway consistently took the view, prior to 
 73 Ibid Draft Conclusion 6(1).
 74 Cf. ibid Draft Conclusion 10(2).
 75 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 215.
 76 International Law Commission, above (n 71), Draft Conclusion 6(3).
 77 The discussion of this question that follows does not include, for reasons of space, the 
question of geographic scope in areas where title to territory generating overlapping 
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the conclusion of a maritime boundary agreement with Russia in 2010, that its 
continental shelf and eez boundary with Russia in the Barents Sea should be 
an equidistance line, whereas Russia took the view that the boundary should 
be a sector line, that is, the line of longitude running northwards from the ter-
minus of the land border. Where two States have advocated different bound-
ary lines in this way, the area between those lines may be referred to as the 
‘disputed area’. It may be argued that in that situation the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper applies only in the disputed area.78
That raises the question of what happens where only one or neither party 
has advocated a boundary line, or the line advocated by one of the parties is 
plainly unreasonable in the light of international jurisprudence on maritime 
boundary delimitation. In its order of provisional measures in the Ghana/ Côte 
d’Ivoire case, the Special Chamber of the itlos applied a test of plausibility 
to determine whether Côte d’Ivoire had continental shelf rights that could be 
the object of protection by provisional measures.79 Applying that reasoning 
by analogy, one could argue that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper 
would not apply to those parts of the area where the maritime zones of the 
States concerned overlapped that could not plausibly be claimed by more than 
one of them as its maritime zone. Admittedly, that is a rather imprecise test. If 
there is doubt about a particular area, the States concerned would be advised 
to exercise restraint.
A more nuanced approach to the geographic scope of the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper is to argue that the obligation is not binary, i.e. it applies 
in certain areas but not in others, but rather that it varies qualitatively depend-
ing on the area and activity concerned. Certain types of activity may be prohib-
ited completely within those parts of the undelimited area where a neighbour-
ing State’s claims are strongest, but may be permitted to some degree where 
the neighbouring State’s claim is weaker, and dependent, for example, on an 
evaluation of applicable relevant circumstances. Again that is a rather impre-
cise test, and so States would be well advised to err on the side of caution if 
they seek to apply it.
A further approach is to reject the notion of geographic limits to the obli-
gation altogether, and instead evaluate conduct, wherever carried out, on its 
propensity to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a maritime boundary 
 78 Ioannides and Lagoni take the same position:  see Ioannides, above (n 5), 364; Lagoni, 
above (n 45), 356– 357.
 79 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivo-
ire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire), Provisional Measures, Order of 25 April 
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agreement. Such an approach is closer to the text of Article 74(3) and 83(3) 
and avoids the problems in determining the geographic scope of the obligation 
outlined above.
2.4.3 The Temporal Scope of the Obligation Not to Jeopardize 
or Hamper
Article 74(3) and 83(3) provide that the obligation not to jeopardize or ham-
per applies during ‘this transitional period’. In the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case the 
Special Chamber held that this phrase refers to ‘the period after the maritime 
delimitation dispute has been established until after a final delimitation by 
agreement or adjudication has been achieved’.80
2.4.4 Other Possible Obligations of Restraint in Undelimited Areas of 
Overlapping eez s and Continental Shelves
The Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case showed that there may be means of restrain-
ing the activities of States in undelimited overlapping eez s and continental 
shelves other than through the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. First, 
Côte d’Ivoire claimed that Ghana had violated its sovereign rights by engaging 
in exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the disputed area before the 
boundary had been delimited. It argued that because States’ sovereign rights 
over their continental shelves were inherent and exclusive, international law 
required a State to refrain from any unilateral economic activity in a disputed 
area of continental shelf, pending its definitive delimitation, since it might vio-
late the sovereign rights of the other State should the disputed area eventually 
be attributed to the latter. The Special Chamber rejected that argument, hold-
ing that ‘maritime activities undertaken by a State in an area of continental 
shelf which has been attributed to another State by an international judgment 
cannot be considered to be in violation of the sovereign rights of the latter if 
those activities were carried out before the judgment was delivered and if the 
area concerned was the subject of claims made in good faith by both States’.81
That ruling is not very satisfactory. The Special Chamber gave no authority 
to support its ruling other than a brief quotation from the Nicaragua/ Colombia 
case on a similar, though not identical, point,82 which was itself unsupported. 
It seems difficult to reconcile the Special Chamber’s ruling with the obliga-
tion not to jeopardize or hamper, at least as interpreted and applied by the 
tribunal in the Guyana/ Suriname case, and the Special Chamber’s own order 
 80 Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, above (n 12), para 630.
 81 Ibid para 592.
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of provisional measures in the present case (summarized briefly below). The 
reference to ‘claims made in good faith’ might suggest that the principle con-
tained in the ruling applied only to those areas of overlap that could plausibly 
be claimed by both States. However, the Special Chamber’s observation that 
‘in a case of overlap both States concerned have an entitlement to the rele-
vant continental shelf on the basis of their relevant coasts’83 suggests that the 
principle applies to the whole of the overlapping area. Furthermore, from a 
policy perspective the principle is undesirable as it may encourage unilateral 
hydrocarbon activity in disputed areas. The principle as enunciated was prob-
ably wider than was necessary to decide the case, since Ghana appears not to 
have undertaken any activities on what turned out to be Côte d’Ivoire’s side of 
the boundary line (although the Special Chamber did not make any finding on 
that point). In light of the policy implications referred to, the narrowest possi-
ble reading of the Special Chamber’s principle should be preferred.
A second possible means of restraint is through the use of provisional mea-
sures made by a court in a pending maritime boundary case.84 In practice, such 
measures are rarely requested: in the 25 or so such cases to date, just two requests 
have been made, and only one of those was successful. That was in the Ghana/ 
Côte d’Ivoire case, where Côte d’Ivoire had more success than with its other argu-
ments when it persuaded the Special Chamber to make an order of provisional 
measures in its favour.85 That order, inter alia, required Ghana to ensure that no 
new drilling took place in the disputed area and to prevent information obtained 
from exploration activities in the disputed area that was not already in the public 
domain from being used in any way whatsoever to the detriment of Côte d’Ivoire. 
Provisional measures are, however, of limited utility as a means of restraint, since 
they can be used only when judicial proceedings for a maritime delimitation have 
been instituted and they are of relatively short duration.
3 Obligations in Areas of Undelimited Overlapping Continental 
Shelves beyond 200 M86
There are a considerable number of areas where the continental shelves 
of opposite or adjacent States beyond 200 M (outer continental shelves) 
 83 Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case, above (n 12), para 591.
 84 Further on this question, see biicl Report, above (n 3), 35– 39.
 85 See (n 73).
 86 The biicl Report, above (n 3), does not deal with this issue, nor the issue of overlapping 










Robin Churchill - 9789004372887
Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:01:47PM
via free access
International Law Obligations of States 163
overlap, or may overlap, depending on what recommendations are made by 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs) in respect of 
outstanding submissions and any further submissions that may be made.87 
Relatively few overlapping outer continental shelves have so far been delim-
ited, either by agreement88 or, except in three cases, by an international court 
or tribunal. In respect of undelimited overlaps, the obligations of Article 
83, discussed in the previous section, apply. Thus, the States concerned are 
required to effect a delimitation of their overlapping outer continental shelves 
by agreement, resort to the dispute settlement procedures of Part xv of the 
losc where no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, 
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
pending an agreement,89 and not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a 
boundary agreement.
While it is clear that Article 83 applies in respect of undelimited outer con-
tinental shelves, there is some uncertainty at what point in time its obligations 
begin to apply, given that, unlike for the inner continental shelf, coastal States 
do not automatically have a defined outer limit for a continental shelf extend-
ing beyond 200 M but must establish its outer limits (if they consider that their 
continental shelf extends beyond 200 M), in accordance with the procedure 
set out in Article 76 and Annex ii of the losc, that is, by making submissions 
to the clcs and awaiting the latter’s recommendations. One possible answer 
to the question of when the obligations in Article 83 begin to apply is that it is 
only when the clcs has made its recommendations to the States concerned, 
as it is only at that point that there is an authoritative determination that the 
continental shelves of those States extend beyond 200 M and that an overlap 
exists. However, it is arguable that the obligations in Article 83 arise earlier. 
In the Bangladesh/ Myanmar case the itlos held that it could delimit the 
 87 As at 3 September 2020, 50 of the 85 submissions made up to that date were awaiting rec-
ommendations from the clcs: see http:// www.un.org/ depts/ los/ clcs_ new/ commission_ 
submissions.htm; accessed 6 October 2020.
 88 For a partial list of such agreements, see bm Magnússon, The Continental Shelf beyond 200 
Miles: Delineation, Delimitation and Dispute Settlement (Leiden, Brill, 2015), pp 187– 208 
who lists 15 agreements as having being concluded by 2015.
 89 There is already at least one example of a provisional arrangement applying to the 
outer continental shelf: see Mauritius- Seychelles Treaty concerning the Joint Exercise of 
Sovereign Rights over the Continental Shelf in the Mascarene Plateau Region (adopted 
13 March 2012, in force 18 June 2012, 2847 unts 277)  and Treaty concerning the Joint 
Management of the Continental Shelf in the Mascarene Plateau Region between the 
Government of the Republic of Seychelles and the Government of the Republic of 
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boundary between the continental shelves of Bangladesh and Myanmar, even 
though neither State had at the time received a recommendation from the 
clcs in response to its submission, because there was no ‘significant uncer-
tainty’ that the two States’ continental shelves did indeed extend beyond 200 
M.90 Applying that reasoning by analogy, one could argue that the obligations 
in Article 83 apply once it is clear that there is no ‘significant uncertainty’ that 
the outer continental shelves of two or more States overlap.
There is also a strong policy argument that the obligations of Article 83 
should become applicable before the clcs has made a recommendation. 
Under its Rules of Procedure, the clcs shall not consider a submission ‘where 
a land or maritime dispute exists’ unless all the States that are parties to that 
dispute have given their prior consent to the clcs doing so.91 A considerable 
number of submissions currently before the clcs are stalled because of this 
rule.92 In those cases it is desirable that the obligations of Article 83 should 
apply, not least to avoid exacerbating the dispute and to try to unblock the 
procedure before the clcs through the States concerned entering into nego-
tiations on a maritime boundary agreement under Article 83(1), referring it to 
a third party for resolution in accordance with Article 83(2) or concluding a 
provisional arrangement.
4 Obligations in Areas of Undelimited Overlapping Territorial Seas
Article 15 of the losc deals with the delimitation of overlapping territorial 
seas. It reads as follows:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to 
the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States 
is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is 
 90 Bangladesh/ Myanmar case (n 11), at paras 444– 9.
 91 Rules of Procedure of the clcs, Annex i, para 5(a), available at http:// www.un.org/ depts/ 
los/ clcs_ new/ commission_ documents.htm#Rules%20of%20Procedure; accessed 27 June 
2019. Note that under Art. 76(10) of the losc, delineation of the outer limit of the conti-
nental shelf under Art. 76 is ‘without prejudice to the question of [its] delimitation’.
 92 See the website of the clcs for information as to the submissions concerned: see https:// 
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necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance 
therewith.
This provision is obviously very different from Articles 74 and 83, and on its face 
lacks a requirement for States with overlapping territorial seas to try to agree a 
provisional arrangement or exercise restraint pending agreement on a boundary. 
The difference may be explained by the fact that participants at the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea who negotiated the losc were happy, when it 
came to delimitation of territorial sea boundaries, simply to follow the provisions 
of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.93 Thus, 
Article 15 repeats Article 12 of the 1958 Convention almost verbatim. Delimitation 
of eez and continental shelf boundaries was, by contrast, one of the most con-
tentious and intractable issues at the Conference. Eventually a compromise was 
reached, but the resulting provisions of the losc (Articles 74 and 83) are at high 
level of generality, with the emphasis (as already seen) on procedural matters 
rather than on the substantive method of delimitation.
Article 15 is commonly considered to be a rule of delimitation, directed at 
States. In other words, it is regarded as requiring States to delimit the bound-
ary between their overlapping territorial seas as an equidistance line unless 
historic title or special circumstances indicate a different boundary. However, 
the ordinary meaning of Article 15 and the drafting history of Article 12 of the 
1958 Convention on which Article 15 is based suggest that Article 15 is less a rule 
of delimitation and more an obligation of restraint. According to its wording, 
Article 15 deals with the situation where there is no agreement on a territo-
rial sea boundary between States, and requires them to refrain from extend-
ing their territorial sea beyond the median line, unless there is a situation of 
historic title or other special circumstances. That reading is confirmed by the 
drafting history of Article 15. As mentioned, Article 15 is identical in substance 
to Article 12 of the 1958 Convention. The latter, like the rest of the Geneva 
Conventions, is based on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
on the Law of the Sea.94 The ilc had proposed that territorial sea boundar-
ies should be ‘fixed by agreement between’ the States concerned. ‘Failing such 
agreement and unless another line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary is’ the equidistance line.95 That is clearly a rule of delimitation: the 
 93 Adopted 29 April 1958, in force 10 September 1964, 516 unts 206.
 94 (1956) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol ii, 254.
 95 Ibid Draft Art 12(1) (in relation to opposite States) (emphasis added). Draft Art 14(1) (on 
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boundary is to be agreed; but if there is no agreement, the boundary is the 
equidistance line, absent special circumstances. At the 1958 UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, the ilc’s proposal was rejected and replaced by what is now 
Article 12 of the 1958 Convention. The main reason for this change appears 
to have been because the 1958 Conference failed to reach agreement on the 
breadth of the territorial sea. Without such agreement, as was pointed out by 
various participants at the Conference, one consequence of the ilc’s proposed 
rule would be that in a situation where two States were opposite one another, 
and between eight and 12 miles apart, with one State claiming a 12- mile territo-
rial sea and the other a three- mile territorial sea, the latter would end up with 
a territorial sea of between four and six miles in breadth.96
This drafting history therefore supports the view that in the case of unde-
limited overlapping territorial seas, Article 15 of the losc is less a rule of delim-
itation for States and more an obligation of restraint: the States concerned may 
not extend their territorial sea beyond the equidistance line unless there are 
special circumstances or historic title is involved. Article 15 will work quite well 
as an obligation of restraint provided, first, that neither of the States concerned 
objects to the baselines used by the other State for constructing an equidis-
tance line; and, second, that there is no dispute over historic title or the exis-
tence of special circumstances and their possible effect on modification of the 
equidistance line. Admittedly, these are rather far- reaching provisos. Unlike 
the position in relation to the eez and continental shelf, there is no obligation 
on the States concerned to enter into negotiations on a territorial sea boundary 
or to seek to agree a provisional arrangement. However, it is always possible for 
one of the States concerned unilaterally to refer delimitation of the territorial 
sea boundary to a judicial body for settlement under Part xv of the losc,97 
provided that the other State has not made a declaration under Article 298 
excluding delimitation disputes from compulsory dispute settlement. If it has 
done so, compulsory conciliation will be possible if the conditions in Article 
298(1) are met.
5 Obligations of States Not Parties to the losc
The overwhelming majority of coastal States are parties to the losc. However, 
as of July 2019 there were 14 coastal States that were not parties and to which 
 96 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol iii (1958), 187– 193.
 97 The ‘reasonable time’ constraint found in para 2 of Arts 74 and 83 (discussed in section 2.2. 
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the obligations of the losc therefore do not apply, at least qua treaty provi-
sions. Five of those States (Cambodia, Colombia, Israel, the United States and 
Venezuela) are parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.98 
Under Article 6 of that Convention there is an obligation on States to deter-
mine a maritime boundary by agreement. That would seem to be similar to the 
obligation on States under Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the losc to seek to agree 
to a boundary through negotiations. Article 6 also provides that where there is 
no boundary agreement, the boundary is the equidistance line unless another 
boundary is justified by special circumstances. Four of the five non- losc par-
ties mentioned above (the exception is Colombia) are also parties to the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. As mentioned ear-
lier, Article 12 of that Convention is identical in substance to Article 15 of the 
losc. Thus, what was said earlier about the obligations in Article 15 will apply 
equally to Article 12 of the 1958 Convention.
For States that are parties to neither a relevant Geneva Convention nor the 
losc, the only obligations applying in overlapping maritime zones will be 
those found in customary international law. Those obligations apply not only to 
States that are not parties to the losc but will also govern relations where the 
maritime zones of such States overlap with a State that is a party. Ascertaining 
what obligations apply under customary international law in overlapping mar-
itime zones is more straightforward than might be initially supposed. That is 
because the icj has held that Articles 15, 74 and 83 all represent customary 
international law.99 Thus, the obligations that apply in overlapping maritime 
zones under customary international law are the same as the obligations under 
the losc. There is, however, one procedural difference. That concerns the obli-
gation in Articles 74(2) and 83(2) to resort to the dispute settlement procedures 
of Part xv where no agreement on a maritime boundary can be reached within 
a reasonable period of time. Clearly the dispute settlement procedures of Part 
xv are not available to non- parties to the losc. However, it could be argued 
that the customary law equivalent of Articles 74(2) and 83(2) would be to resort 
to any third party dispute settlement procedures available to the States con-
cerned: that would include both diplomatic and judicial means, since Part xv 
is concerned with both.
There are various general obligations of restraint under customary interna-
tional law that will also be relevant to non- parties to the losc, particularly if 
 98 Adopted 29 April 1958, in force 10 September 1964, 499 unts 311.
 99 On Art 15, see Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v Bahrain), Judgment, (2001) icj Reports, p 40, para 176. On Arts 74 and 83, see ibid 
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there is any doubt that the provisions of the losc referred to in the previous 
paragraph are part of customary international law.100 Those general obliga-
tions also apply, of course, to parties to the losc, although they probably add 
nothing to its provisions.
In the South China Sea case the arbitral tribunal emphasized that where 
dispute settlement proceedings were ongoing, there was an obligation on the 
parties to the dispute not to take any steps that would aggravate or extend the 
dispute.101 One can argue that that principle should extend to the situation 
where States disagree (i.e., are in dispute) over the course of their maritime 
boundary.
The ‘no harm’ principle may also act as an obligation of restraint. The icj 
has held that under customary international law States are obliged to ‘ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment 
of other States’.102 This is a specific application of a more general principle of 
good neighbourliness in international law, often stated in the Latin maxim 
‘sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas’.103 It may thus be argued that States must 
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control respect areas where 
another State not only undoubtedly has, but also may have, sovereignty or 
sovereign rights. In other words, a State must refrain from acts that would be 
a violation of international law if the area where the violation had occurred 
turned out, following delimitation of the boundary, to be part of the maritime 
zones of another State. Support for that conclusion is provided by one of the 
recent Costa Rica/ Nicaragua cases, where the icj held that dredging and other 
activities carried out by Nicaragua on territory claimed by both parties violated 
international law. That was because the Court found that the disputed territory 
belonged to Costa Rica and Nicaragua had carried out its activities there with-
out Costa Rica’s consent.104 Admittedly, the position put forward here does not 
 100 Ioannides argues that the obligations in Arts 74(3) and 83(3) ‘have not yet crystallized’ 
into customary international law. However, they reflect general principles of good faith 
and peaceful resolution of disputes that should be observed by all States. See Ioannides, 
above (n 5), 368.
 101 South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China), 
Award, 12 July 2016, pca Case No 2013- 19, paras 1167– 1173.
 102 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 
(1996) icj Reports, p 226, para 29; subsequently endorsed in Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment, (2010) icj Reports, p 14, para 101.
 103 P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2009)  137; see also BD Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine 
Environment (Clarendon Press, 1988), especially chaps 5 and 6.
 104 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), 
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sit well with the ruling of the Special Chamber in the Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire case 
rejecting Côte d’Ivoire’s argument concerning the alleged violation of its sover-
eign rights by Ghana, but, as suggested earlier,105 that ruling should be treated 
with caution.
6 Conclusion
Worldwide there are some 180 areas where one or more of the maritime 
zones of two States overlap and have not (yet) been delimited by a boundary. 
International law lays down a number of obligations relating to such unde-
limited areas, primarily designed to avoid the lawlessness often associated 
with undelimited frontier areas and to promote the optimum use of resources. 
Those obligations vary, depending on the maritime zone at issue. In the case of 
undelimited overlapping territorial seas, States are required under Article 15 of 
the losc not to extend their territorial sea beyond the equidistance line unless 
there are special circumstances or issues of historic title.
A rather different set of obligations applies to undelimited overlapping eez s 
and continental shelves under Articles 74 and 83 of the losc. Here the States 
concerned must enter into negotiations to try to reach an agreement on the 
boundary between their overlapping zones. Where they are unable to reach 
such an agreement within a reasonable period of time, they must resort to the 
dispute settlement procedures of Part xv of the losc. In addition, pending an 
agreement, they must make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements 
of a practical nature and refrain from acts that would jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of a boundary agreement.
International courts have held that the provisions of Articles 15, 74 and 83 
also represent customary international law. Thus, they apply to the 14 coastal 
States that are not parties to the losc as well as to relations between those 
States and State that are parties, with the proviso that non- parties to the 
losc cannot invoke the latter’s dispute settlement procedures. In addition, 
under customary international law principles, States must refrain from acts 
that would aggravate their disagreement over the location of their maritime 
boundary or that would violate the sovereignty or sovereign rights of the other 
State should the area where those acts take place eventually turn out to be part 
of that other State’s maritime zones.
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It is difficult to know how far the obligations of the losc surveyed in this 
chapter have influenced the behaviour of States. Usually one can only guess 
at the motives for the actions of States since they rarely articulate why they 
behave in the way that they do. Since the entry into force of the losc in 1994, 
a steady stream of maritime boundary agreements has been concluded. One 
assumes that the primary motivation is self- interest rather than acting in 
response to obligations in the losc. Where States have been unable to agree, 
there have so far been relatively few references to dispute settlement under 
Part xv of the losc. There has been one instance of compulsory conciliation 
and five cases of judicial settlement.106 There have also been eleven referrals to 
judicial settlement where jurisdiction was not based on Part xv, either to the 
icj or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.107 In the majority of those cases one or more 
of the parties to the case was not a party to the losc at the time that the case 
was referred.
One exception to the failure of States to explain why they act is the pro-
visional arrangements concluded for overlapping eez s and/ or continental 
shelves, the great majority of which refer explicitly to Articles 74(3) and/ or 
83(3). However, such arrangements have been adopted for only a small number 
of undelimited areas. There have been relatively few reports of incidents that 
could be regarded as breaches of the obligations of restraint in undelimited 
maritime frontier areas, at least in areas where there are not also disputes over 
title to territory. On this matter States have been particularly reticent about the 
reasons for their actions (or inactions), so it is impossible to assess the influ-
ence (if any) of the relevant law.
 106 The Timor- Leste/ Australia conciliation, above (n 21); Barbados/ Trinidad and Tobago, 
Guyana/ Suriname, Bangladesh/ Myanmar, Bangladesh/ India and Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire 
cases (n 11, 12 and 26).
 107 In the case of the icj, the Qatar/ Bahrain case, above (n 99); the Cameroon/ Nigeria case, 
above (n 11); Case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and 
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), Judgment, (2007) icj Reports, p 
659; the Black Sea case, above (n 11); the Nicaragua/ Colombia case, above (n 11); the Peru/ 
Chile case, above (n 11); Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment, (2018) icj Reports, p 100; the Somalia/ Kenya case, 
above (n 12); and Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua 
and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia) 
(icj, pending). The arbitrations have been the Eritrea- Yemen Maritime Delimitation 
Arbitration (1999), (2006) xxii riaa 335; and Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia, 
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